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ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF
COMMERCIAL LAW
By C. Clyde Barker of the Denver Bar
HE origin of Commercial Law, or the Law Merchant,
as it is frequently called, clearly grew out of the customs and usages of merchants.
While it may have existed in a more or less loosely defined state prior to the Christian era, at the same time it owes
its greatest original impetus to the cities of Northern Italy
beginning with the 9th century as pointed out by Charles
Henry Huberich in his introduction to the work entitled "The
Commercial Laws of the World".
After sketching the advantages enjoyed by these cities as
favored by geographical position and certain political and
economic events, and their extensive commercial relations
with Byzantium and the Moslem states and the resultant rise
by Venice to the status of a World market, the strife for commercial supremacy between Pisa and Genoa, Sienna and Milan, and the becoming in the 13th century by Florence of a
great manufacturing city and later the banking center of
Europe and the chief rival of Venice, Mr. Huberick proceeds
to trace the development of commercial law as affected by
these activities as follows: "The rise of the merchant guilds
with their corporate right of legislation in respect to their
own members, and the right to exercise jurisdiction over them
created a large body of statutory and customary law binding
on special classes."
The Law of a particular guild frequently differed from
that of other guilds in the same city.
The unification of the commercial law was achieved
chiefly by combination of several merchant guilds into a large
guild, in turn vested with the usual powers of legislation and
jurisdiction. Those by-laws of the constituent bodies which
had proven of practical utility were, by reason of their adoption by the general guild, given a wider application and finally recognized as of binding force even when opposed to the
general law of the State.
The jurisdiction of the guild courts was gradually ex-
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tended so as to be applicable not alone where the litigant parties were merchants belonging to the guild, but also in other
cases.
Foreign merchants, as well as persons who had ceased to
be merchants, and the heirs of merchants, were in respect of
commercial transactions, subject to the jurisdiction of the special courts.
Finally jurisdiction was assumed in commercial cases between traders and non traders, and in general there was a
tendency to assume jurisdiction upon the ground of the
character of the parties and of the character of the subject
matter.
Procedure in the Commercial courts was summary, expeditious and free from the forms of pleading and technicalities of evidence. The decision was based not on strict rules
of Law, but on principles of equity.
It was the adoption of this body of substantive and adjective commercial law, free from the restrictions of the old Roman, Canon and feudal law that marks the beginning of modern commercial law, and which has so profoundly influenced
the legal institutions, not alone of the continent of Europe, but
also of England, and through the latter, the law of the United
States. Its influence has not been confined to the domain of
commercial law, but has extended to the civil and public law.
It was a new force to break down the formalism of older
systems, and to bring them into accord with the new social and
economic conditions.
It is interesting to trace the spread of the Law Merchant
in England, its subsequent development there, and its influence
on and ultimate assimilation into the Common Law of England.
This development was marked by three distinct stages.
The first one may be fixed as ending at the appointment
of Coke as Lord Chief Justice in 1606. Prior to that time, the
Law Merchant constituted a special law administered by special courts for a special class of people. It remained distinct
as a separate body of law, and this arose of necessity out of the
business of merchants and traders. Thus we find Sir J. Davis
was caused to,remark that until he "understood the difference
between the Law Merchant and the Common Law of England.
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he did not a little marvel what should be the cause that in
the Books of the Common Law of England, there ought to be
found so few cases concerning merchants and ships; but now
the reason was apparent, for that the Common Law did leave
those cases to be ruled by another law, the Law Merchant,
which is a branch of the Law of Nations."
To administer this Law, commercial courts were set up,
principally the courts Fair, courts of the more important
towns, and courts of the staple. In all these tribunals, as in
the case of the guilds of Northern Italy, the chief object aimed
at was expedition, and in none was justice meted out with
greater celerity than the courts of Fair, otherwise known as
the "Court of Pied-Poudre or Pi-Powder" taking its name
from the French meaning the "dusty foot", signifying dustyfooted dealers and itinerant merchants to whom justice was
administered while the dust was still on their feet, or before it
could be shaken off, an expedition in the matter of' justice
against which it is thought our most clamorous present-day
complainants against the Law's delay could register no just
complaint.
We find Coke referring to this Court as follows: "This
Court is incident to every Fair and market because that for
contracts and injuries done concerning the Fair or market,
there shall be speedy justice done for advancement of trade
and traffic, as the dust can fall from the feet, the proceeding
being from hour to hour."
These courts sat both in the forenoon and in the afternoon
to distinguish their sessions from the-King's court whose judges
sat only from 8 to 11 in the forenoon, and spent the remainder
of the day in consultation in chambers. Their contemplative
faculty did not set well with the merchants, who, being men
of action, required justice to be speedy.
The second stage of the development of the Law Merchant commenced with the term of office of Lord Coke as
Chief Justice in 1606, and according to Mr. Scrutton in his
"General Survey of the History of the Law Merchant", lasted
until the time when Lord Mansfield became Chief Justice in
1756, and during that intervening time the peculiarity of its
development is this-that the special courts die out and the
Law Merchant is administered by King's courts of Common
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Law, but is administered as a custom and not as a law, and at
first the custom only applies if the plaintiff or defendant is
proved to be a merchant; and it was the habit to leave the
custom and facts to the jury without any directions in point of
law, with the result that cases were rarely reported as laying
down any particular rule because it was almost impossible
to separate the custom from the facts.
And as a result during this period very little was done
towards building up any system of Mercantile law in England.
An instance of the dissatisfaction experienced in thus attempting to administer the Law Merchant in Common Law
Courts was found in the criticism thereof by Malynes in His
"Lex Mercatoria, or Ancient Law Merchant" wherein after
commending the Law Merchant as being always constant and
permanent, he directs at the Common Law the following
thrust: "In chancery every man is able, by the light of Nature, to see the end of his cause and to give himself a reason
therefor, and it is therefore termed a cause; whereas at the
Common Law, the client's matter is called a case according
to the word 'casus' which is accidental, while a party doth
hardly know a reason why it is by law adjudged with or against
him."
Lord Mansfield was dissatisfied with its conditions, and
upon assuming the Chief Justiceship in 1756 set about his
great abilities to its improvement. How he did this cannot be
better stated than by Scrutton in his essay on "Roman Law
Influence", "This Lex Mercatoria had therefore a Roman
Foundation, and the importance of this will be seen when we
remember that Lord Mansfield, the father of Modern Mercantile Law, during the thirty-two years in which he was Lord
Chief Justice of the King's bench, constructed his system of
commercial law by molding the findings of his special juries
as to usages of merchants which had often a Roman origin on
principles frequently derived from the civil laws in the law of
Nations." One among Junius' attacks on him expressly alludes to this feature of his: "In contempt or ignorance of the
Common Law of England, you have made it your study to
introduce into the Court where you are presiding maxims of
Jurisprudence unknown to Englishmen, the Roman code, the
Law of Nations, and the opinions of foreign civilians are your
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perpetual theme". A charge for which, says Lord Campbell,
there is not the slightest color of pretense. He did not consider the Common Law of England a perfect code adopted to
the expanded, diversified, and normal requirements of a civilized and commercial nation, but in no instance did he ever
attempt to substitute Roman rules and maxims for those of the
Common Law. He made ample use of the compilations of
Justinian, but only for a supply of principles to guide him
upon the questions unsettled by prior decisions in England,
deriving also similar assistance from the Law of Nations and
modern continental codes.
The nature of his work was well described by Buller,
Justice, in his celebrated judgment in Lickbarrow v. Mason
where he says, concerning bills of Lading, "Thus the matter
stood till within these thirty years, since that time commercial
law in this country has taken a very different turn from what
it did before. Before that period we find that in the courts
of Law all the evidence in mercantile cases is thrown together;
that they were left generally to a jury, and they produced no
established principle. From that time we all know that great
study has been to find some certain general principles-not
only to rule the particular case then under consideration, but
to serve as a guide to the future. Most of us have heard these
principles stated, reasoned upon, enlarged, and explained till
we have been lost in admiration at the strength and stretch
of the human understanding. And I should be sorry to find
myself under a necessity of differing from Lord Mansfield
who may truly be said to be the founder of commercial law of
this country."
It is interesting to note the relations between Lord Mansfield and the special juries he trained for use in commercial
cases as found set out in Campbell's "Lives of the Lords Chief
Justices".
(To be continued in October issue)

